Top man on the totem pole

The remaining three kills were all claimed by Flight Lieutenant Khalid mahmood, who in the space of just over seven weeks, established himself as 'top man on the totem pole' when it came to the F-16 community. There is every possiblity that he could have surpassed Squadron Leader Mohammad Mahmood Alam'scelebrated 1965 feat of destroying five aircraft in a single sortie. Khalid's first success came on:

September 12th, 1988

Khalid recieved an order to scramble from the ADA facility at Kamra at 0700 hours. On getting airborne, Khalid ( who was flying as lead in F-16A 85-728) and his wingman were directed by GCI to head a north-west towards the border in the vicinity of Nawagai. As they moved towards the designated area, word was passed by GCI that radar revealed the presence of a pair of hostile aircraft at around 32,000 ft on a heading og 90 degrees and behaving in such a way that a voilation appeared likely. To head off this threat, the two F-16s were vectored almost north on a heading of 330 degrees, only to learn that the radar contacts had also turned on to a northernly course and were now flying parallel to the border but remaining inside Afghanistan. At this point, the the F-16s swung right to an easterly heading and 'shackled' (performed a cross-over manoeuvre). Within a few moments of taking up this new course, GCI reported three more enemy aircraft at about 33,000 ft. The two fighting Falcons performed roughly a 180 degrees turn and headed towards the fresh contacts. Still at 10,000 ft, Khalid very quickly brought his own radar into play. This revealed the enemy flight to be four-strong, in echelon starboard with about 3,000 ft of separation between each member of the formation . Khalid proceeded to lock up the No. 4 at a range of 16 nm and saw that his own heading was 280 degrees. He then engaged afterburner and told GCI that he was accelerating to 550 kt before instructing his wingman to begin climbing. As they ascended, both aircraft passed

through broken cloud at 20,000 ft, Khalidthen observing a RHAW (Radar Homing and Warning) indicating which alerted him to the fact that the hostile aircraft were Mig-23s. He notified GCI of this and then succeeded in gaining a visual 'tally' at a range of 7 nm, subsequently noticing that the four Afghan warplanes were in clean condition (i.e., no drop-tanks or bombs) and that they all featured a basically khaki camouflage colour scheme. At about the same time the first two MIGs reversed their course and began heading back towardsthe F-16s at about 33-34,000 ft. It was also apparent that this pair was rapidlyoverhauling the front four, which would seem to indicate that the latter had decelerated, perhaps in an attempt to place F-16s under threat. If it were indeed a tactical ploy, it failed dismally to succeed in its objective. Khalid chose to press on with his pursuit of the larger group and at a arange of 1.3 nm while in an attitude of 135 degrees of bank (i.e. near inverted) at 33,000 ft, he launched an AIM-9L at the No. 4 aircraft. Quickly rejecting the lock, he rolled out into level flight and turned to look for the original pair which was now much too close (about 5,000ft/1524 m away) as they overshot the four-ship. Since the pair clearly posed no immediate danger, Khalid turned his attaention back to the larger group and locked on to the No. 3 from almost directly astern at a distance of about 13,500 ft. It was now that Khalid worked out a cunning plan which, if executed correctly, would allow him to kill all six enemy aircraft. Basically, it envisaged using his three remaining Sidewinders (one AIM-9L and two AIM-9Ps) to 'splash' the last three of the four-ship element before disposing of the other two with the Vulcan M61 cannon.

In accordance with that plan, Khalid launched an AIM-9P at the No. 3 aircraft while at 34,000 ft on a heading of 40 degrees, and then began moving towards the No. 2. At this moment, GCI intervened with a warning call to break right. Khalid responded immediately and in doing so lost his chance of outdoing Alam's earlier achievement. Perhaps the most frustrating thing about this call was that it was subsequently found to be unnecessary and was probably prompted by 'clutter' on GCI's radar display.Whatever the reason, that manoeuvre cost Khalid precious seconds and even though he attempted to re-engage, by now the remaining enemy aircraft were in a descending left-hand turn and accelerating away towards the sanctuary of Afghanistan. With regard to the two MIG-23s that Khalid did engage, the Pakistan Army later found wreckage of both. Khalid remains confident that he would have taken all six had he not been distracted by the false call.

Squadron Leader Khalid's and PAF's last confirmed victory came on 3rd November 1988 during the course of a CAP mission near Kohat. On this occasion, Khalid was flying F-16A 84-717 as No. 2 in a two-ship formation. The encounter opened with Khalid and his leader at 10,000 ft when they were informed by GCI that six contacts were heading towards the border, a subsequent message confirmed that three of these had violated Pakistani airspace while the other three stayed right on the border line.

On a heading of 280 degrees, the two F-16s moved to engage, the lead very quicly informing GCI that he had radar contact. Khalid obtained a lock on the No. 2 aircraft, which was flying on the southern side of the formation. They continued to close the gap but a distance of 8 nm Nos. 2 and 3 of the enemy formation opted for direction and executed a 180 degrees turn, which very quickly allowed them to regain the security of Afghanistan. Khalid then advised his leader that his contact had turned tail. For some reason, the leading Afghan fighter kept coming and at a range of 7 nm, the F-16 lead pilot obtained a visual tally, with Khalid following suit moments later. At this time both F-16s were still at 10,000 ft while the bandit - which was confirmed as a Su-22 was some 7000 ft higher. Both F-16s then initiated a gradual climb as the Su-22 began turning to depart, the enemy pilot having been advised by his GCI of the presence of the two F-16s. His tardiness in heading for safety was to prove an expensive error. Khalid's lead elected to press home his attack, but the Su-22 pilot then showed good tactical sense by turning to face the threat. This prevented the first F-16 from getting off a missile, although that its pilot had experienced some difficulty with his Sidewinder which may have prevented him from engaging. In choosing to evade the threat posed by the leading F-16, the Su-22 pilot placed hinself at the risk of attack by Khalid, who wasted no time in making a hard right turn into the Su-22. He duly launched an AIM-9L from a range of 2.7 nm in a head-on pass. While all that was going on, the lead F-16 began manoeuvring into a position which would enable him to engage the Su-22 with gunfire from a six-o'clock position. He still had some way to go when Khalid's Sidewinder struck home , smoke and panels falling from the damaged fighter, which continued flying about 10 nm inside Pakistan.

Khalid realised very quickly that the Su-22 was damaged. he waited a few more seconds before launching another AIM-9L at an aspect angle of about 150-160 degrees, this barely leaving the rail before the enemy pilot ejected . This missile also scored a direct hit, causing the Su-22 to break in two and headed earthwards on fire. The entire incident was observed from the ground by personnel of the Pakistan Army and by Pathan tribesmen. Khalid was subsequently showered with gifts, including a Kalashnikov and sundry other weapons. Captain Hashim, the luckless Afghan pilot, was captured and revealed under interrogation that all six aircraft were from a squadron at Matun. Three had been tasked with air-to-ground operations while the other three flew top cover, but it seems that the colonel in charge ran away as the strike element crossed the border. In an odd postcript, Hashim also allegedly said that his mother had told him not to fly that day.

For the PAF, that was just about it, although Khalid was to enjoy a further moment of excitement when flying solo night 'hot' scramble mission in an F-16B on January 31st, 1989. On this occasion, he was directed to investigate a border violation near Bannu and he duly headed towards the area at 10,000 ft under GCI direction. Repeated attempts at obtaining an IR lock on the enemy contact (which was down at 2,000ft/610 m and which was suspected to be engaged on a bombing raid) failed to meet with success. As Khalid moved closer under GCI control, the aircraft put its light on and was revealed to be an An-24. Under the rules of engagement then in force, Khalid was directed to let it go, so he pulled up and began flying above it, advising GCI that it looked like the An-24 was planning to land. Ultimately, the transport made an approach to the River Kuram ( a dried-up river bed ) and the pilot may have been under the impression that it was a paved runway. Moments after touching down, the An-24 struck a palm tree and cartwheeled before being engulfed in a massive explosion, followed by numerous secondary detonations as the load of ammunition it was carrying 'cooked-off' in the intense heat.